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State of New York
Supreme Court : County of Monroe
_______________________________
In the Matter of the Petition of
The People of the State of New York,
Citizen's Oversight Committee,
Charity Fellowship Church, Inc.,
Friends & Family of Elvie Taylor, deceased,
Petitioners,
for a Judgment pursuant to CPLR Article 78
- against - Index No. 2002/5125
Monroe County District Attorney's
Office and Department of Social Services,
Mark Maves, Leane Mosier, Howard Relin,
Kenneth Maurice, Samantha Crane,
Inv. Harkness,
Respondents.
_______________________________
MEMORANDUM DECISION
This opinion is uncorrected and is subject to revision in the official Reports
ANDREW V. SIRACUSE, J.
Lawyers may form a fraternity of sorts, but the law is not intended to be the preserve of a closed corporation. The right of lay litigants to bring or defend a lawsuit pro se is a valuable one, and the courts are unwilling to limit it. But that right is limited to cases which directly concern the pro se litigant. It is another matter when a lay person sets himself up as an advocate on behalf of others.
In the present case, in fact, it is unclear on whose behalf the Rev. David Moore, the actual litigant, is acting. The named petitioners are a nebulous assortment; the court has never found out what the "Citizen's Oversight Committee" oversees, or who constitutes it, or what charter guides its operation. It appears from the self-styled caption that the Charity Fellowship Church is a corporation, but nowhere can it be determined if the church adheres to any denomination. Only a few years ago its minister was announcing himself to be a master of kung fu and a lama in the Vajrayana tradition of Tibet.
Nor are the "friends and family of Elvie Taylor, deceased", defined with any specificity. This is not Surrogate's Court, and it is not necessary in all cases for a decedent's cause to be prosecuted by one with letters of administration; but surely some principles of selection apply. And Reverend Moore's grandiose claim to act on behalf of the "People of the State of New York" is unauthorized by any known principle of law.
It is all too obvious that Reverend Moore is either pursuing claims for which he has no standing or is acting as an attorney; and CPLR § 321 (a) provides specifically that corporations and voluntary associations must appear through an attorney, which the courts correctly define as one properly admitted to the practice of law. Rev. Moore claims his authority arises from the definition of "attorney" in CPLR § 105 (c): "The word 'attorney' includes a party prosecuting or defending an action in person." A glance at the caption will show that Rev. Moore is not a party to this action, except perhaps as a member of a voluntary association. But if any member could appear for the association in a legal proceeding (as a representative, for example), CPLR 321 (a) would be rendered meaningless. As one must interpret a statute to give effect to all words, Rev. Moore's ingenious argument must fail.
There is little to be gained from tracing this proceeding's tortuous procedural history, but mention should be made of a single-page "Motion to Compel Recusal" sent by Rev. Moore on May 17, 2002. This document seeks my disqualification (Rev. Moore evidently does not know that recusal is discretionary and cannot be compelled) on the basis that
the Honorable Andrew V. Siracuse and Clerk Michael Steinburg [sic], Esq., are Parties of Adverse Interest, Parties of Conflict and potential Co-Respondents in an already filed Federal Civil Action by Petitioner(s) in the WESTERN DISTRICT FEDERAL COURT on April 12, 2002, Case No: 02-MC-6006L
No further information about this mysterious action was supplied amid the baroque splendor of the Rev. Moore's typography and vocabulary, and the court therefore rejects his equally logorrheic conclusion that
ANY further discussion, information, disclosure or appearance before or pertaining to the Honorable Andrew V. Siracuse and Clerk Michael Steinburg [sic], Esq., in the herein matters, represents a compromise of privilege and ethical considerations on behalf of not only the Court, but the undersigned and Petitioner(s) herein, and thus a compromise to jurisprudence justice.
Deputy County Attorney Lexvold, who has the unenviable task of responding with legal arguments to the petitioners' feverish allegations, points out that the majority of the respondents were never personally served, and that a notice of petition in proper form, with a correct return date, was served on nobody at all. On procedural grounds alone, this proceeding should be dismissed. But it should be made clear that even a properly served and filed proceeding would meet the same fate.
It appears that one Daniel Taylor was indicted for reckless endangerment of his mother Elvie on October 4, 2001, and charges in Justice Fisher's court are still pending against him. A proceeding under Article 81 of the Mental Hygiene Law was brought at roughly the same time, and an order signed by Justice Bergin on November 13, 2001, named Family Service of Rochester as guardian.
The substance of the petitioners' allegations is that the County's District Attorney and much of its social work staff engaged in a conspiracy to remove Elvie Taylor from the care of her son and bring about her death in a hospital. The motivation for this conspiracy is said, variously, to be a desire by a tyrannical government to gain economic control over its citizens, a plot by "BIG MONEY Corporations and Medical Insurance Carriers to CHEAT the Elderly out of Medical Care, Retirement Plans, and all possible Benefits BY KILLING THEM " or a wish to silence the voices of older people who speak out for their rights.
If there were any evidence to support these wild charges, it should have been brought forth at either of the other proceedings. Nothing of any probative value has been adduced here, even if it were proper for this court to consider it. Moreover, nothing the petitioners demand in their convoluted papers could even be granted by this court. Without wearying the reader with more direct citations, this is the relief requested:
1) A warrant of arrest against District Attorney Howard Relin and others for the depraved indifference murder of Elvie Taylor, among other crimes. This is something that this court has no authority to order.
2) An injunction barring any further proceedings against Daniel Taylor. Once again, this is something over which this court no jurisdiction. No injunctions and no Article 78 writs of prohibition run against ongoing criminal proceedings. The sole remedy is a defense by Mr. Taylor. If proceedings terminate in his favor he (though nobody else) is free to sue on a theory of malicious prosecution.
Incident to this demand is one that the court refer this matter to the FBI. The court has no more authority over this organization than does any private citizen.
3) Petitioners recognize that the District Attorney could not prosecute himself, and thus demand the appointment of a special prosecutor. This, however, falls under County Law § 701, and § 200.5 of the Uniform Rules for Trial Courts provides that application for a special prosecutor must be made to the Chief Administrator of the courts, who consults with the presiding justices of the Appellate Divisions. This is an inappropriate venue for such an application.
4) A demand for all of the evidence in the case against Daniel Taylor and a writ of prohibition barring further proceedings. As pointed out above, no writ of prohibition lies to bar criminal prosecutions. Furthermore, the evidence against Daniel Taylor is discoverable only in the criminal proceeding, and in fact it was furnished to Taylor's defense counsel.
5) "Sanctions and Damages" of $2,000,000. There is clearly no basis for this.
Courts are remarkably flexible institutions, but they are designed to resolve disputes. They function poorly as platforms for political agitation. This is something attorneys understand, but which those with little experience of the practice may not. The dangers of a proceeding running off in all directions are less when competent counsel presents the case. They are minimized in the pro se prosecution or defense of a civil suit, because the limits of a party's legal interest guides him or her along legally appropriate paths. No such limits are apparent to the self appointed advocate, such as Rev. Moore. This unfounded and incomprehensible lawsuit is the result, and the court for procedural and substantive reasons has no option but to dismiss the petition in its entirety, with prejudice. In view of the highly scandalous nature of the allegations, it is not improper for the court to order that the dismissal be with costs. Mr. Lexvold should prepare the order.
DATED: Rochester, New York
July 16, 2002 Andrew V. Siracuse, J.S.C.
This opinion is not available for publication in any official or unofficial reports, except the New York Law Journal, without the approval of the State Reporter or the Committee on Opinions (22 NYCRR 7300.1)
Design © 1997 Michael Steinberg. No copyright subsists in the decision texts, which are government documents.
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