State of New York
Supreme Court : County of Monroe

- against -

Index No. 2002/1044

This opinion is uncorrected and is subject to revision in the official Reports

ANDREW V. SIRACUSE, J.

There is no liability issue in this summary judgment motion. Instead, the parties disagree on the issue of reasonable replacement cost. Plaintiff's Toyota Prius, a gas/electric low-emissions high-fuel-mileage vehicle, was totally destroyed in an accident for which defendant was entirely to blame. The plaintiff promptly ordered a replacement vehicle identical to the one that had been destroyed. Unfortunately, the demand for the Prius was extremely high, and the supply problems were exacerbated by a model change. It took close to nine months for Toyota to fill the order. In the interim plaintiff used a rental car, until the difficulty of getting a new Prius so concerned the dealer that plaintiff was loaned a Camry, a gas-only vehicle, at no cost.

The accident occurred in May 2001, and the Prius was finally delivered in February 2002. The plaintiff seeks damages for car rental until the end of November 2001, when plaintiff received the free loan of the Camry. The rental bills come to $5666.85. Defendant argues that her liability extends only to a reasonable period of time for the acquisition of a replacement vehicle, citing a Fourth Department case both agree is on point (Allanson v Cummings, 81 AD2d 16). The defendant submits that once plaintiff was put on notice that the delay in shipping a Prius would be 90 to 120 days‹a wildly unrealistic figure, as it turned out‹the plaintiff should have purchased a different vehicle.

But the point of the Allanson case is precisely that cars are not all alike. There could be no more reasonable replacement than the identical model that was destroyed. Plaintiff is a firm with a strong commitment to environmental responsibility, and chose the Prius for its specific advantages of fuel economy. This advantage cannot be had with a conventional vehicle.

The Allanson court stated the rule as follows:

[P]laintiff must initially prove that for a stated period he was in fact unable to obtain a replacement vehicle. Upon such proof plaintiff may then recover damages for the loss of the destroyed vehicle's use which is the reasonable rental value of a substitute vehicle for a reasonable period of time until a replacement can be made (81 AD2d, at 21).

In a subsequent decision the Fourth Department explained its reasons for abrogating "the ancient common-law rule that, although the owner of a damaged chattel may recover for loss of its use during the time required for repairs, he may not recover if the chattel is destroyed":

The rule, based on the assumption that because the owner can replace the destroyed chattel immediately he suffers no loss beyond its value, "presupposes the existence of a broad market with frequent trading in articles of an identical character with the property lost" (7C Warren, Negligence [1982 ed], ch 18, § 1.02, p 34). In Allanson, we noted that in today's market immediate replacement of a vehicle is not always possible (Cecere v Harquail, 104 AD2d, 6, at 7)

Because the difficulty was the result of market considerations only, it is necessarily reasonable so long as it was proper for the plaintiff to require an exact replacement of the specific car. At the present time, at least, gas/electric hybrid vehicles are rare enough that there can be no fact issue concerning the reasonableness of the plaintiff's insistence on replacement by an identical vehicle. (It is questionable whether such an insistence is ever unreasonable as a matter of law, but the court does not need to decide the broader issue.) It is defendant, not the plaintiff, that must bear the burden of damages when the vehicle destroyed by the defendant's conduct is an unusual model that is expensive or difficult to replace. This case is essentially a vehicular version of the old legal adage that you take your victim as you find him.

The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted, with costs. Counsel for plaintiff may prepare the order.

DATED: Rochester, New York

November 4, 2002

Andrew V. Siracuse, J.S.C.

This opinion is not available for publication in any official or unofficial reports, except the New York Law Journal, without the approval of the State Reporter or the Committee on Opinions (22 NYCRR 7300.1)

Design © 1997 Michael Steinberg. No copyright subsists in the decision texts, which are government documents.

HOME GUIDES CASES ISSUES INDEX